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A BSTRA CT
In 1903, Henry James published The Ambassadors, the novel he deemed
“quite the best. . .of all [his] productions” (“Preface” to The Ambassadors, 2).
James describes the work as a “process o f vision” (“Preface” 2) in which the hero,
Lambert Strether, comes to “see” that reality and the truth it dictates depend on
individual perceptions.
In 1915, Ford Madox Ford, a literary disciple of James, published The
Good Soldier, the novel he considered his “best book” (“Dedicatory Letter” to The
Good Soldier, xvii). Permeated by the Jamesian legacy, The Good Soldier is also a
“process o f vision.” Like Strether, John Dowell o f The Good Soldier learns that
reality is not an objective manifestation perceived equally and similarly by
everyone. And like Strether, Dowell is called upon to integrate his discoveries
into his knowledge of himself and construct a coherent, stable sense o f reality
and truth from which he can formulate a code o f conduct.
But The Good Soldier is not simply an imitation o f The Ambassadors. The
circumstances of plot and narration that differentiate Dowell’s quest from
Strether’s reveal that Ford did not merely inherit Jamesian artistic principles, but
revised and reinterpreted them, producing a singular vision o f literary method
and perspective. The fundamental difference between the two writers is Ford’s
pessimism; for not only does it define his reinterpretation of Jamesian devices,
themes, and characterizations, it underscores the optimism that defines Jam es’s
work.
That optimism emerges in Strether’s psychological strength and the
expanded self-awareness that his discovery of subjective reality engenders. In the
end Strether is able to construct a stable sense o f truth from which he can make
ethical judgments. In contrast, Dowell, psychologically fragile and unable to
integrate his discoveries, is overwhelmed and reduced by the realization that
reality is not objective; thus he is unable to formulate a firm, balanced sense of
truth. The moral ambiguity of his final position represents the culmination of
Ford’s pessimism and his essential difference from James.
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VISIONS OF REALITY: A COMPARISON OF NARRATIVE
METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN
THE AM BASSAD ORS A N D THE GOOD SOLDIER

O f Henry James, Ford Madox Ford wrote, "Mr. James is the greatest of
living writers and in consequence the greatest of living men" (Henry James: A
Critical Study, 9). Ford's admiration of James emerges not only in his critical
essays, but in his fiction as well. In what is generally considered Ford's greatest
novel, The Good Soldier (1915), the influence of James is undeniable and at times
pervasive. While The Good Soldier is reminiscent of a number of James's works,
The Ambassadors (1903) is particularly conducive to a comparative study of the
narrative methods the two writers employ. The Good Soldier exhibits elements
of Jamesian settings, devices, themes, and characters that make comparison
inevitable. Ford's work, however, does not merely echo; rather, it responds to
and reinterprets Jamesian techniques and perspectives.
Both novels are psychological narratives in which crossing the Atlantic
Ocean from America to Europe signifies a quest for truth. Lambert Strether of
The Ambassadors initially sails to Paris as the first ambassador of his patron,
Mrs. Newsome, in order to save her son, Chad, from a liaison she assumes is
degenerative. But, in Paris, Strether finds C had a cultivated gentleman in
whom the signs of moral decay are conspicuously absent. The lack of those
signs, combined with the presence of C had's suavity, transforms Strether's
mission. In consequence of not finding what he expected, Strether must
construct a new understanding not only of Paris and his obligation to Mrs.
Newsome, but of his life.
Unlike The Ambassadors, The Good Soldier is a retrospective narrative.
2

3
But confounded expectations have a similar effect on its protagonist, John
Dowell, in his backward-looking quest for truth. Forced by the unexpected
collapse of his "coterie," Dowell must review his understanding of the
relationships and experiences that formed the most important decade of his
adult life. Whereas Strether must reformulate his method of interpreting the
present, Dowell must reinterpret the more distant past, particularly his original
view of it. Despite the different time frames of the people, circumstances, and
actions they interpret, both Strether and Dowell are Americans confronted by a
reality they had not anticipated. This confrontation leads to the realization
that reality is not objective and immutable, but subjective: a construct of
individual perceptions and judgments. As a result of the subjectivity of reality,
truth becomes relative as well.
In "The A rt of Fiction," Henry James asserts th at "you will not write a
good novel unless you possess the sense of reality; but it will be difficult to give
you a recipe for calling that sense into being. Humanity is immense, and reality
has a myriad forms" (658). Just as reality is difficult to define because of its
multiplicity, so is truth because it is contingent on reality. James and Ford
demonstrate that truth is never a static construct, but ever-expanding as contact
and communication with others offer continuing opportunity for comparison of
individual realities. O f course, reality and truth are rarely so easily divided as
this definition implies. Indeed, reality and truth are merely abstracted labels for
the cognitive stream that produces them; one merges into and repeatedly
reshapes the other as they form a spiraling continuum. While James and Ford
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do not define these concepts per se, Strether and Dowell demonstrate not only
the cognitive functions that construct individual reality and truth, but often a
metacognitive awareness of what they are doing. For Strether and Dowell,
finding and understanding truth is synonymous with self-awareness. Strether
completes his search by accepting his responsibility to make an ethical choice
based on what he learns. Thereby Strether exemplifies James's optimistic faith
in the hum an capacity to manage a reality and truth that are contingent on the
subject that constructs them. A lthough Dowell reformulates his personal reality
after comparing it to th at of others, thereby expanding his sense of truth, he
remains, in the end, unequal to the task of composing a coherent reality that
enables him to better understand himself and his circumstances. But it is the
moral ambiguity of Dowell's final position that demonstrates Ford's pessimism
about the hum an capacity to cope with and act upon the subjectivity of truth.
Ford's adaptation of Jamesian techniques is controlled by his pessimism, and
therein lies the two author's primary difference.
Both The Ambassadors and The Good Soldier are related through the
limited perspective of their heroes. In the "Preface" to The Ambassadors, James
terms the "business o f The Ambassadors and "the march of [its] action. . .[a]
process of vision"—a description th at applies to The Good Soldier as well (2).
John Tytell and Paul Armstrong apply a modified version of James's term to
the design of both novels calling them a depiction of the "process of knowledge"
(Tytell 369). All information that the reader receives comes through the mind's
eye of the hero, which is not to say that the reader can know only as much as
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Strether and Dowell. The reader brings his own perception and judgment to
their stories. In addition, the reader can reflect on elements of the narratives
that Strether and Dowell do not, thereby composing a fictional reality quite
different from theirs. In fact, both novels elicit the reader's awareness of his
own "process of knowledge." To this end, the reader may form sympathetic
identification with Strether and Dowell and become a questing hero himself.
Because Strether and Dowell lack the reader's advantage of stepping
away from their stories, they cannot escape the internal upheaval caused by the
instability of external reality. The psychological crossing from certainty in
objective truth to doubt in the possibility of finding meaningful truth
necessarily triggers perplexity and anxiety. Their ability to make choices,
particularly ethical choices involving relationships, becomes problematic when
they become aware that their moral precepts are grounded not in objective
truth, but in the sense of tru th that they (and others) have formulated.
In both novels, America, specifically New England, breeds moral
certitude and Paris moral crisis. Indeed, in the "Preface" to The Ambassadors,
James explains that he chose Paris because of "the dreadful little old tradition,
one of the platitudes of the hum an comedy, that people's moral scheme does
break down in Paris" (7). But Paris also represents the jewel of European
Catholicism. James and Ford place provincial American Protestants amid the
realm of sophisticated European Catholics to flesh out the dichotomy between
old world and new world moral constructs. Sexual conduct is the pivotal issue
that triggers moral crises, but in both novels the ethics of relationships
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ultimately run deeper than just the issue of sexual conduct.
The differences between American and European sensibilities complicate
the role of interpretation in creating reality. Strether and Dowell experience
perplexity when their frame of reference-the assumptions that guide
understanding-does not fit their experience. In Paris both protagonists
discover that people in whom they have deep emotional investments, people
whom they believe they know and understand, are or were engaged in extra
marital affairs. While the course of their discoveries is different, they both face
the essential issue of conduct that does not match expectations. T hat issue
arises from the belief that "good11people do not intentionally engage in
apparently immoral conduct. A nd both protagonists are blinded by their
belief. Successfully overcoming that blindness requires adjusting the frame of
their assumptions, while retaining a balance between internal expectations and
external phenomena. The process of attempting to adjust th at frame is the
primary action of both novels. In their attempts to alter their perspectives,
Strether and Dowell underscore the extent to which interpretation determines
truth.
By thematizing interpretation, James and Ford convey the elusiveness of
meaning. For Strether and Dowell (and the reader) finding tru th entails
establishing meaning, which is not usually immediately apparent in such
complex signs of reality as people, relationships, and conduct. The senses
perceive those signs and the mind assigns meaning. But perception and the
mind's comprehension are finite; thus the physical, spiritual, and mental
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position of the subject necessarily limits any assigning of meaning. Despite
these limitations, however, people do create a sense of reality and from it a sense
of what is true.
In general terms, Strether and Dowell share character traits that give
them similar limitations of perspective. Both men have led somewhat passive
lives with no remarkable or exciting successes. Both have largely depended on
others for the purpose and means of their existence. Thus they begin their
quests from comparable psychological backgrounds. As unassertive bystanders
they have formulated parallel moral expectations from which the limitations of
their assumptions stem. They diverge, however, in their ability to overcome
the obstacles to expanded tru th that their expectations create.
O ne of the most challenging obstacles Strether and Dowell face is the
real and perceived absence of signs. They must do interpretive work like that of
the artist-as-detective who uses intuition and deduction to interpret pieces of
reality th at are missing and the reasons they are missing. In "The A rt of
Fiction," James contends that an artist's "source of strength" is his "power to
guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things, to judge the
whole piece by the pattern" (659). In The Ambassadors and The Good Soldier,
absence ultimately represents the true nature of the relationships Strether and
Dowell perceive and attem pt to understand. In Strether's world, absence is the
result of concealment by others and the self; as such it is an impediment to
interpretation that can be overcome through patient observation,
communication, and most importantly, perhaps, a readiness to see. Strether's
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eventual ability to discover hidden signs manifests James’s confidence in the
hum an capacity to interpret reality. In Dowell's world the difference between
perceived and real absence is moot because the revelation of one absent sign
leads only to greater awareness of absence. In the end, Dowell has detected
many of the previously hidden signs that contributed to the wreck of his life,
but the fundamental cause of th at absence continues to elude him. Ford's
pessimism resides in Dowell's irresolvable position. The absence behind which
Dowell can never see doubles back on the reader who can never determine if
Dowell's failure to see is a result of his unreadiness or the actual and perpetual
absence of the fundamental sign th at he seeks. Thus Ford extends the Jamesian
principle that absence both stimulates and frustrates interpretation to
demonstrate th at synthesis of these dialectic positions is never achieved.
The idea that absence stimulates interpretation informs the narrative
pattern of both novels, but in different ways, Strether seeks missing or hidden
information by following a path of inquiry. John Tytell identifies this pattern in
The Ambassadors as the depiction of a series of "unanswered questions [that]
postpone information and prolong Strether's quest" (371). The opening words
of the novel are "Strether's first question”; thus from the beginning James sets
the rhythm th at stabilizes the narrative. Having Strether ask questions in an
order he can handle allows him to cope with new ideas at his own pace. In
effect, Strether controls the search for truth. By placing Strether in the
director's chair, James illustrates his optimism in the hum an capacity to
compose meaningful truth from a subjectcentered reality. In fact, James's
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manner of presenting Strether affirms and celebrates the process of
interpretation th at leads to knowledge.
Strether’s ability to control his quest reflects James's determination to
control the limited perspective of his novel. While James wants "Strether's
sense of. . .things. . .his more or less groping knowledge of them" to form the
novel, James does not want the narrative reduced to "looseness" by the
"romantic privilege of the 'first person'" ("Preface" 8-10). James's object was to
concentrate the tale on Strether's changing psychology, to create a sense of
intimacy with his hero while avoiding the disunity and monotony that result
from "the terrible fluidity of self-revelation" ("Preface" 11). To this end James
filters everything through Strether, but retains the omnipotent control afforded
by third person narration. Thus, Strether both stars in and directs his story but
James is the executive producer.
The supporting cast—Maria Gostrey, Little Bilham, C had Newsome, and
Mme. de V io n n et-to name the most im portant-are Strether's "confidants" and
"aid[s] to lucidity "-th e listening characters who assist Strether's story ("Preface"
12). Their role, James explains, is to "wave away with energy the custom of the
seated mass of explanation after the fact, the inserted block of merely referential
narrative" ("Preface" 11). These characters engage Strether in dialogue, thereby
reducing the "menace to a bright variety" of entirely subject-centered internal
monologue. Primarily through their role as sounding boards, Maria and
company either pose to or elicit from Strether the questions to which he seeks
answers.
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The variety that the listening characters add to the narrative pattern
fulfills James's conception of realistic discovery, both of the self and the external
world. In other words, much of what people know of themselves and others
derives from spoken interaction. In verbal communication it is incumbent upon
the speaker to put his thoughts into order, to arrange his ideas in a form that
listeners can understand. The element of unpredictability ever present in verbal
interaction often forces the speaker and listener to create coherence where a
need for it had not been anticipated. This obligation to make sense on the
spur of the moment can be epiphanic in its revelation of the way unreflected
parts fit into a whole. Strether's quest for truth includes a series of epiphanic
dialogues that lead him through the process of discovery and propel the action
of the novel. These dialogues are further evidence of James's confidence in the
hum an psyche's capacity to create meaning.
James's optimism does not preclude hesitation and doubt in Strether;
bewildered steps backward often temper the progression of Strether's search.
Detailed descriptions of Strether's reflections simultaneously actuate and
suspend his protracted, but forward, movement toward an expanded sense of
truth. Through the dramatization of Strether's mental and psychological
movements, James makes Strether's "consciousness. . . actionable" (Seidel 144).
By lingering on Strether's consciousness, James may seem to manipulate
narrative structure in order to magnify an artificial process, when in fact he
accounts for the time Strether needs to sort through his impressions.
Although the narrative structure of The Ambassadors testifies implicitly to
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James's optimism, the subject of the novel is the explicit proof of th at optimism.
From the time Strether checks into the hotel in Liverpool, he exhibits a
predisposition toward change, toward the epistemological turn th at his mission
will take. Strether breathes his first "draught of Europe" enlivened by "such a
consciousness of personal freedom as he h ad n 't known for years; such a deep
taste of change and of having above all for the moment nobody and nothing to
consider, as promised already, if headlong hope were not too foolish, to colour
his adventure with cool success" (17-18). Why is Strether's psyche so open to
the transforming influence of Europe? His "dear old" American friend
Waymarsh remains, after several m onths in Europe, immune to its effects. But
Strether is "burdened. . .with the oddity of a double consciousness. . .[a]
detachm ent in his zeal and curiosity in his indifference" that Waymarsh lacks
(18). Paul Armstrong points out that in Strether "expectation guides
understanding" (70). Strether holds the traditional American assumptions that
Europe breeds depravity, while simultaneously seeing the potential for
refreshment in its differences. Essential to this "double consciousness," or
perhaps part of it, is Strether's abundant im agination-his ability to conceive of
another's point of view. In short, Strether's psyche is ripe for the liberating
perspectives he encounters in Paris.
Ostensibly, Strether's purpose in Europe is not to free himself from the
constraints of American sensibilities, but to reindoctrinate Chad. Strether's
quest changes from a mission to repatriate Chad to a search for truth.
Strether's "double consciousness" initiates his transformation. Immediately
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recognizing that predisposition, Maria Gostrey welcomes him to Europe like a
hostess, easing some of his culture shock with her "thorough civili[ty]" (21)
while at the same time intriguing him with her unconventionality. But mostly
it is M aria’s knowing eyes that lure Strether to her:
the eyes of Strether's friend most showed him. . .the mistress of
a hundred cases or categories, receptacles of the mind, subdivisions
for convenience, in which, from a full experience, she pigeonholed her fellow-mortals with a hand as free as that of a
compositor scattering type. . .He had quite the sense that she
knew things he didn't, and though this was a concession that in
general he found not easy to make to women, he made it now as
good-humouredly as if it lifted a burden. (21-22)
M aria's knowledge does lift a burden; she demonstrates for Strether the art of
deduction: filling in the puzzle pieces that are missing from the pieces that are
present. In Arm strong's words she is a "model of the illuminating imagination
for Strether to emulate" (82). Maria's interest in Strether's original mission is
not so much how he will repatriate C had—she understands the tactics of family
pressure and money well enough. Rather, Maria's questions focus on why
C had appears not to want to return to Woollett. W hat in Woollett repels C had
at the same time that something in Paris compels him? This apparently simple
act of viewing C had's situation from a different point of inquiry-the why
question as opposed to the how question-frames Strether's task anew. Maria's
vantage challenges Strether, triggering "uncontrolled perceptions. . .as a
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starting-point for fresh backward, fresh forward, fresh lateral flights" (42). Thus
Maria prepares Strether to appreciate Chad.
In grooming Strether as a detective, Maria "cost[s]Hhim his "past—in one
great lump" (40). If M aria's questions prompt Strether to consider C had's
situation from a new angle, they also induce him to examine his own life. The
epiphanic spirit of dialogue, in which Strether answers M aria’s inquiries, unveils
to Strether the suffocating restrictions of the Woollett world view. By the end
of "Part One," she has made him recognize and acknowledge his fear of life-that
prison th at he makes for himself by "always considering something else. . .than
the thing of the moment" (26). Strether fears the "sacred rage" of Woollett:
that strict moral code through which Mrs. Newsome would view Strether's
association with Maria as a transgression. Insofar as transgression equates to
crossing from a limited American perspective to the realization that other
perspectives are possible, Strether does transgress. He happily agrees to "pay"
Maria with his "last penny" for her "illuminations," her guidance, and her
powers as a muse (40). She intensifies his yearning for freedom from the
restrictive world view imposed by Woollett and his obligation to the Newsomes.
C had accelerates Strether's psychological crossing and reshaping. It is
precisely C had's own transformation that so influences Strether. Rather than
showing the physical and spiritual signs of moral corruption that Paris
supposedly wreaks on innocent Americans, C had embodies suave affability,
maturity, and a "way" of handling himself, which Strether reluctantly concedes
is "wonderful" (91). C had's migration has made him over into a man whom
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Strether not only likes, but admires. Among the differences in C had that
Strether observes is C had's lack of "resemblance" to his mother (92). It is
remarkable to Strether that a "young m an's face and air [could] disconnect
themselves [so] completely. . .from any imaginable aspect of a New England
female parent" (92). Even more impressive to Strether than the change itself is
the possibility th at anyone could break so completely free of Mrs. Newsome and
the "sacred rage." If Maria is the model of expanded vision, C had is the symbol
of the liberated life that such vision brings.
W ith such positive role models, what, then keeps Strether from totally
immersing himself in the liberating spirit of Paris? Namely, it is the "double
consciousness" that enables Strether to appreciate Maria and Chad. If Strether
is graced by his capacity to enjoy Paris, he is also damned by it. His appetite
for Paris derives precisely from his American sensibilities. Paris is the fruit that
his New England mores forbid him to taste, which places Strether in the
paradoxical position of craving that of which he is most wary. Strether's
suspicions take aim at C had, who has partaken of the enigmatic knowledge and
freedom that Paris engenders. Strether's obligation to Mrs. Newsome, who is,
in effect, the absent personification of Strether's provincial conscience, tempers
his admiration of C had. Although Strether experiences many perplexities and
doubts at the hands of C had, one certainty that Strether does have is Mrs.
Newsome's disapproval of C had and Paris. With the distance of an ocean
separating them, Strether is able to rationalize his betrayal of Mrs. Newsome
and the moral restrictiveness that she personifies, but he cannot escape it
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entirely. The "sacred rage" is ingrained in Strether's being, so that "the
intensely personal and complex drive to absorb qualities one lacks or discard
qualities one abhors is often frustrated by defenses and loyalties that one carries
as a part of a national baggage" (Seidel 141). Extirpating the "sacred rage"
entirely would be nearly impossible and as fatal as removing a vital organ.
Strether "hangs fire" from complete conversion to Paris and all that it
personifies, because he must to survive.
Merely surviving, though, is what Strether laments in the most famous
speech in the novel. A t Gloriani's garden party, with the panorama of pulsing,
"wonderful" life before him, Strether urges Bilham, "live all you can; it's a
mistake not to. It doesn't so much matter what you do in particular, so long as
you have your life. If you haven't had that what have you had?" (132). All that
Strether has missed flashes before his eyes in a sort of death-in-life review of his
life. The fear of risk that has dulled him into complacency haunts him.
Strether’s musing th at he "was either, at the right time, too stupid or too
intelligent to have" (132) a full life rings true of his "double consciousness." He
has seen too much, in that the hyper moral sensitivity of Woollett scrutinizes
every action; and he has seen too little, in that the scrutiny is from such a
limited point of view. While Strether addresses his speech to Bilham, who
doesn't need it, Strether's words are really for his own ears. The remainder of
the novel is the test of his assertion that "the right time" to seize life "is any time
that one is still so lucky as to have" (132).
Earlier in his speech about "the affair of life," about missed opportunities,
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and risks not taken, Strether concedes that much of what people call living is
"the illusion of freedom" to pursue a satisfying life (132). He goes on to add
that "the memory of that illusion" is better than no illusion at all (132).
Obviously this statement manifests Strether's equation of freedom to life. A nd
though his assertion seems incompatible with his quest for truth, it perhaps
evidences Strether's subconscious realization that reality is a personal construct.
Almost unintentionally, Strether raises one of the most complicated issues that
James explores, which is essentially the question: If one believes himself free,
regardless of the accuracy of th at belief, isn't one really free? The insoluble
dialectic initiated by this inquiry provides much of the underlying tension in
The Ambassadors and ultimately it is the hinge on which Strether's final ethical
choice turns. Strether's final ethical decision to forsake Maria illustrates James's
conclusion that belief in perception, i.e. subjective reality, can result in a
resolution th at preserves integrity.
True to the Jamesian legacy Ford inherits, Dowell poses a question in The
Good Soldier th at is much the same:
If for nine years I have possessed a goodly apple that is rotten at
the core and discover its rottenness only in nine years and six
months less four days, isn't it true to say that for nine years I
possessed a goodly apple? (14)
Dowell's inquiry throws a twist into Strether's by changing the elements of the
equation. While Strether asks about freedom and life, Dowell focuses on the
narrow opposition between belief and knowledge. The apple, as the proverbial
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metaphor for knowledge, symbolizes the figuratively prelapsarian state of naive
trust in which Dowell existed before the collapse of the "little four-square
coterie" (The Good Soldier 13). He believed that he knew his wife, Florence, and
the A shburnhams, who were "what in England it is the custom to call 'quite
good people,"' (12) but he finds that he had "known the shallows," (11) a
simulacrum of the people he counted most dear and most intimate to him. In
his deluded assumption of a knowledge he did not actually possess, Dowell was
happy, or at least content. Disabused of his illusions, Dowell faces not only an
entirely new understanding of himself and his former friends, but the realization
that his former happiness and security were invalid because they rested on a
cracked foundation. Dowell has arrived at the other side of the illusion that
Strether considers better than complacency and failure. The problem for
Dowell is that his illusion was bred of complacency and failure, and now that he
no longer has the chimera of his "minuet de la cour" he must learn again how
to live (13).
Their positions on opposite sides of the illusion bespeak the psychological
difference between Strether and Dowell. Strether's question treats the illusion
as a means of expanding one's life. He uses illusion as an emotional buttress
that gives him the courage to have new encounters, consider challenging
possibilities, and face difficult choices-all experiences that widen and deepen his
awareness of varying realities, and ultimately himself. Dowell uses illusion as an
emotional fortress that allows him to shut out life's frightening, but potentially
enlightening experiences. In short, Dowell uses illusion to avoid not only
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reality, but life, and himself. Therein lies the difference in the outcomes of
Strether's and Dowell's quests. Strether's search for the truth is propelled by
psychological strength, while Dowell's is undermined by psychological fragility.
T hat Dowell's vulnerability steers the course of his search is particularly
evident in the questions he poses. Rather than stabilizing his progress or
demonstrating control, as Strether's questions do, Dowell's questions rush out
of him as a gesture of frustration and utter bewilderment. W hen he reaches a
psychological impasse in his attempts to relate and put into some order the
wreck of his "tranquil life," Dowell resorts to unanswerable inquiries that
threaten to upset his precarious mental balance. Dowell's frequent response of
"I d o n 't know" to his own wonderings becomes the guiding refrain of his
narrative. "Chapter One" ends with a deluge of questions that illustrate
Dowell's desperation:
I d o n 't know. A nd there is nothing to guide us. A nd if
everything is so nebulous about a matter so elementary as the
morals of sex, what is there to guide us in the more subtle morality
of all other personal contacts, associations, and activities? O r are
we meant to act on impulse alone? It is all a darkness. (18)
Unlike Strether, Dowell perceives himself as alone and shrouded in
darkness as ethical ambiguities assail him. He prefaces his questions with the
answer "I d o n 't know" as an ineffective defense against the menace of instability
and uncertainty.
A similar passage in The Ambassadors casts Strether in a position parallel
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to Dowell's, but with an entirely different perspective. A bout C had's presumed
liaison with a woman in Paris, Waymarsh asks Strether:

. .what the devil do

you know?" Strether "almost gaily" answers: "I guess I d o n 't know anything!"
(72). The narrator qualifies Strether's "gaiety" as "a tribute to the fact that the
state he had been reduced to. . .was somehow enlarging" (72). Immediately
recognizable is Strether's fearlessness of the unknown. Indeed, his mental blank
causes exhilaration, for in "reducing" him it creates the space that will
accommodate the wealth of his discoveries. Strether sees the unknown as an
invitation to learn "anything about anything" (72). His acceptance of that
invitation demonstrates his fortitude.
Strether's psychological strength is also evident in the narrative
perspective of the novel. A lthough The Ambassadors and The Good Soldier are
both limited to the perspectives of their heroes, a fundamental difference in
their narrative circumstances underpins the polarity of their psychological
positions. Both James and Ford strike a balance between sympathy and
distance, but their methods of achieving this balance are different. Much of the
strength that characterizes Strether derives from the support of his reliable,
omniscient narrator. Through third person narration, James affords a double
perspective th at encourages the reader to invest in Strether's quest, but
concurrently keeps the reader in the position of witness to Strether's perplexities
and revelations. Dowell, on the other hand, relates his quest directly, through
a first person voice that gives the reader an uncensored view of his
vulnerability. While Ford withholds the stability created by third person
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narration, his frequent ironization of Dowell's perspective enables the reader to
observe and judge the fuller reality that Dowell refuses or is unable to see. Thus
Dowell's psychological fragility is the very means by which Ford allows the
reader to create a double perspective thereby achieving a balance between
sympathy and distance.
By withholding omniscient perspective Ford also forces the reader to
experience Dowell's interpretive dilemma. In the first chapter the reader learns
not what has shattered Dowell's stability, only that it has left him knowing
"nothing-nothing in the w orld-of the hearts of men" and "alone—horribly
alone" (14). In panvridden confusion Dowell describes the "breaking up of [his]
little four ^square coterie" (13), but omits the cause of its collapse. Rather than
seeing the cause, the reader sees only the effect, which is Dowell's overwhelming
grief and perplexity. Dowell's omission of the cause compels the reader to
experience the frustration of interpretation stimulated by absence. Throughout
the course of the narrative the reader eventually sees more than Dowell, but the
purpose of the first chapter has already been accomplished. T hat purpose is to
make the reader aware of absence, of the missing pieces that force him to
interpret so that he can try to make sense of Dowell's story.
Dowell strives to conjure an atmosphere of intimacy, both emotional and
physical, by welcoming the reader with soothing words. The "I" that conveys
the tale of The Good Soldier relentlessly saturates every angle of the narrative,
closing the distance between the subject reading the novel and the fictional
subject writing the novel. Frank Nigro explains that "Ford asks us not merely
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to read Dowell's narration: he wants us to hear and see it" (383). Eventually the
sympathy that Dowell arouses is mediated by the images he uses to arouse it.
Dowell begins the second chapter by asking the reader to bear with him in his
narrative search for a safe harbor in which he can anchor the reconstruction of
his life.
So I shall just imagine myself for a fortnight or so at one side of
the fireplace of a country cottage, with a sympathetic soul opposite
me. A nd I shall go on talking, in a low voice while the sea sounds
in the distance and overhead the great black flood of wind
polishes the bright stars. (19)
T he sense of isolation and smallness generated by the images of a remote setting
amid the primordial sounds of the sea and the enveloping presence of the dark
sky exposes Dowell's feelings of inadequacy and confusion. A lthough Ford's
narrator often seems inept in his attempts to tell a coherent story, the
atmosphere that he creates so accurately reflects his psychology that Dowell's
fumblings suggest he is attempting to draw the reader into his self-delusion. If
Dowell's tone of familiarity and vulnerability initially stirs sympathy in the
reader, it eventually arouses doubt as well.
Dowell's fumblings and confusion result in an erratic narrative that
compels the reader to interpret not only Dowell's story, but his competence as a
storyteller. Kathryn Rentz describes Dowell's narrative as "a chaotic, violent
novel quite different from the comparatively tidy and restrained Jamesian
works" (104). Violence and chaos reside not only in events such as the suicides
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of Florence and Edward, and Maisie's grotesquely comic demise, but in the
narrative structure itself. Dowell's telling of the "saddest story [he has] ever
heard" often verges on incoherence, becoming so difficult to follow at times that
Dowell seems barely sane. The first paragraph of "Chapter Three" exemplifies
Dowell's haphazard style of story telling. He begins the chapter with a reference
to the date and Florence as a patient "taking the baths" at Nauheim (26).
Distracted by the concept of patienthood, Dowell contemplates himself as a
patient, then he considers the surroundings that make one feel naked at public
resorts and the "polished up" tidiness of such places. The image of tidiness
leads Dowell to recount the careful arrangement of everything at Englischer
Hof, and finally "the exact" number of paces one takes to get from the
Englischer Hof to the fountain. In this passage and throughout the novel,
seemingly insignificant details constantly derail Dowell's attempts to narrate the
action of the central characters and events of the "saddest story." His
digressions bespeak his desire to avoid focusing on the wreck of the coterie,
even though he claims that his purpose is to understand and explain its
collapse. Dowell's narrative method is often that of the artist who fills in the
details surrounding the central image, while leaving the image itself blank or
only partially filled in. His acute focus on peripheral elements results in a
discontinuity that distorts the reader's view of the narrative.
T he fragmented structure of Dowell’s narrative becomes the guiding
pattern (or nonpattern) of the novel. Initially, Dowell's endeavor to interpret
the people and circumstances of his life pulls the reader into his hermeneutic
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circle, thereby instilling sympathy. Eventually, however, Dowell's interpretative
strategies undercut the reader's; subsequently, the reader doubts the reliability
of Dowell's narrative voice, and recovers objectivity through that doubt.
The confusion and doubt that Dowell's narrative generates have fueled
critical debate about his reliability as a narrator. Mark Schorer asserts that
Dowell is not credible because he cannot distinguish between appearances and
reality, so he cannot accurately portray the past. Schorer attributes Dowell's
distortion of the past (whether intentional or not) to his unacknowledged
bitterness about "the paltry destiny that, he thinks, life has forced upon him"
(xii). O ther critics, beginning with Patricia McFate and Bruce Golden and
extending to Roger Poole, plot the many discrepancies in Dowell's time scheme
to show that his reliability is questionable. But Samuel Hynes and Hugh
Kenner view Dowell's fallibility as the "norm" and essential to Ford's overall
technical strategy. According to Kenner, who casts Dowell as the pawn of
Ford's reluctance to "resolve the book," The Good Soldier lacks a "center" (168).
Rather than finding a stable perspective, "one is driven through ironic mirrorlined corridors of viewpoint reflecting viewpoint. . .an optical illusion of infinite
recession" (Kenner 168). Kenner ascribes the constantly shifting orientation of
the novel to Ford's own indecision about the "situation he presents" (168).
Ford's excessive "compassion" for his hero arises from his "impasse of sympathy
for all sides" (Kenner 168). Hence, Dowell can never find an anchoring point of
view because Ford cannot. While Kenner accurately assesses the multiplicity of
viewpoints as the central theme of the novel, he identifies Dowell too closely
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with his creator, shifting the indictment of unreliability from Dowell to Ford.
In giving Dowell a free hand in telling his story, Ford intentionally allows
Dowell's lapses in accuracy, insight, and judgment. Those lapses and the lack
of an anchoring viewpoint are entirely Dowell’s irresolvable position. The
absence of a center in Dowell’s narrative reflects his perception of the world as a
chaotic place unguided by a composing, objective set of rules. Dowell's
vacillations, such as his vehement condemnation of Edward's extra-marital
affairs followed by his energetic defenses of Edward's passionate nature, reflect
Dowell's inability to find within himself a framework of ethics around which to
build his understanding of himself and the world.
If anything, Ford achieves greater distance from his narrator by
permitting Dowell's fragility to corrupt his voice. The "fluidity of self
revelation" against which James guarded his authorial control is the very means
by which Ford achieves his control. James's sympathy for Strether, though
strenuously veiled in third person omniscience, becomes apparent in Strether's
achieving a unified identity and effective interpretive strategy amid the unstable
signs of reality that confront him. While the "looseness" of Dowell's narrative
suggests Ford's sympathy for Dowell, simultaneously it signifies that Ford
maintains enough distance from his narrator to portray the obstacles, both
internal and external, that impede a person's attempts to understand himself
and the world. Hence, Dowell's weaknesses and failings convey Ford's
detachment.
Dowell's psychological fragility is both the cause and result of factors that
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are more challenging than those Strether encounters. O ne complication in
Dowell's quest is temporality. Unlike Dowell, Strether seeks to understand
signs of reality which unfold in the present, so that while he experiences some
anxiety about the future, he has the opportunity to control or change the
circumstances of his life. Strether's "double consciousness" does cause him
psychological conflict and at times self-delusion, but, in its most negative form,
it is a safety valve that allows him to progress through his story at a pace that
he can handle emotionally and mentally. Moreover, he can use the selfawareness th at he develops in the process of his search to influence his
relationships and the events surrounding them. In other words, Strether can
move forward because both his actions and interpretation take place in the
present where they can be integrated. Hence, Strether has the benefit of
influencing reality so that it actually fits his interpretation, rather than the
reverse.
In contrast, the most important events that Dowell seeks to understand
occurred in the past. The knowledge th at Dowell gains will never enable him to
alter the relationships and circumstances that he is examining. Indeed, three of
the players are dead and one is insane, so he does not have the advantage of
going back to replay his role if the reality disturbs him; he can only reinterpret
it. Literally, Dowell can only sit in the present while he tries to reinterpret the
past. Challenged by the constraints of time, Dowell cannot move forward and
think of the future until he resolves the past. To accomplish that task Dowell
must shape three versions of the past into one coherent, unified sense of reality
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that allows for its multiplicity of sides. He must puzzle through his original
experience of the past, obviously a construct of naivete and illusion; his view of
Edward’s romanticized but "mournful1’ perspective; and finally his awareness of
the less rose-colored, but undoubtedly more cynical version offered by Edward's
widow, Leonora. All of these versions culminate in Dowell's "redefinitions of
events" (Hood 450), which he decides to tell as a "story" (19). Primarily, it is
Leonora's version th at necessitates Dowell's reconciliation of past illusion to
present disillusionment. For it is from Leonora that he gets "the news" of
Florence's suicide and Edward's infidelities "full in the face" (100). The events
that Dowell learns of are violent not only in themselves, but in their effect on
his already fragile psychology. First, he learns that Florence did not die of heart
failure, but committed suicide. W hat is more, the revelation of her affair with
Edward means that she manipulated Dowell with a tangle of deceits. Yet, more
tragic for Dowell is the discovery that his "good soldier," Edward Ashburnham ,
is not the role model for which Dowell took him. Initially, Edward supports
Dowell’s illusion of the world as an ordered place in which a code of conduct
guides actions and thoughts. In being "the cleanest looking sort of chap;~an
excellent magistrate, a first rate soldier, one of the best landlords. . .just exactly
the sort of chap that you could have trusted your wife with," Edward personifies
Dowell's version of the "sacred rage" (18). A t the same time, though, Dowell
perceives Edward as a sort of C had figure with the bearing of a gentleman and
an enigmatic knowledge "that seemed to drop out of the blue sky" (30). Dowell,
with so much of his own identity and security invested in the image of Edward
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as a "good soldier," resists abandoning that image. A nd so Dowell, with his
own brand of the "sacred rage" and his own C had figure, is afflicted by his own
"double consciousness." In Dowell's case, the conflicting desires and emotions
it produces suspend him in time. He would like to cling to his illusion of the
past in order to preserve the stability and order of his internal and external
world, but Leonora's disclosures preclude this. Short of blocking out her
revelations entirely, Dowell cannot avoid the "facts." To construct a coherent,
unified story, Dowell must admit and accept not only his role as dupe, but also
a world in which codes of conduct do not signify actual conduct-appearances
do not signify reality.
Dowell's denial of emotional conflict indicates his unreadiness to forfeit
pretenses for reality. Less than halfway through his narratives he asserts,
directly to the reader, that he is numb.
You ask how it feels to be a deceived husband. Just Heavens, I do
not know. It feels just nothing at all. It is not Hell, certainly it is
not necessarily Heaven.

So I suppose it is the intermediate stage.

W hat do they call it? Limbo. No, I feel nothing at all about that.
(68)

O n the next page, Dowell follows this denial with the admission: "I hate
Florence. I hate Florence with such a hatred that I would not spare her an
eternity of loneliness" (69). Passages such as these bring Dowell's reliability into
question, for he is in limbo, but it is not the result of no feeling; rather it
emerges from an excess of contradictory emotions that Dowell cannot resolve.
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He consistently portrays Florence with bitterness for her deceptions, but he
cannot conclusively condemn Edward for his. Dowell fluctuates, first blaming,
then excusing, then trying to understand Edward's deceits. While Dowell's
vacillating emotions are not negative in themselves, his denial of them and the
resulting lack of self-awareness contribute to his inability to understand and
move beyond the past.
Fear is the fundamental emotion that drives Dowell, for it is the source of
his self-delusion. He repeatedly claims th at he received his first knowledge of
Florence's infidelity and suicide a week after Edward's death, but much of his
narrative belies his claim. His self-deception becomes particularly apparent
during his narration of the scene at the castle of M—. His first reference to
Florence's displacement of Leonora is metaphorical: he recalls seeing "a brown
cow hitch its horns under the stomach of a black and white animal and the
black and white one. . . thrown right into the middle of a narrow stream" (44).
Dowell remembers distinctly his amusement at the scene as he "chuckled over it
from time to time for the whole rest of the day" (44) and his lack of pity for
"the poor animal" because he was "out for enjoyment" (45). The reader, at
least, equates the cows to Florence and Leonora, even though Dowell never
directly links them. His failure to realize the symbolism of the scene might be
attributed to his naivete, but his pointed admission of enjoyment suggests that
on some level he was aware that pretension was a veil for treachery and refused
to let it disrupt his "pleasant" life.
T he scene in which Leonora nearly reveals the affair between Edward
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and Florence more forcefully indicates Dowell's resistance to acknowledging the
truth. Dowell recalls th at when Florence "laid one finger upon Captain
A shburnham 's wrist" he "was aware of something treacherous, something
frightful, something evil in the day" (46) The scene drives Leonora to the verge
of fully disclosing the affair. Clutching Dowell's arm she beseeches him:
"D on't you see?. . .don't you see what's going on?" (47). But she retreats from
the admission, apparently because she recognizes the "panic" in Dowell's eyes
(47). Regardless of what Leonora realizes about Dowell, he gives the reader an
uncensored view of his paralyzing terror of the truth.
She looked me straight in the eyes; and for a moment I had the
feeling that those two blue discs were immense, were overwhelming, were like a wall of blue that shut me off from the rest of the
world. I know it sounds absurd; but that is what it did feel like.
(47)
In this recollection Dowell reveals what he fears most about consciously know
ing th at Florence is having an affair with Edward; he fears isolation. The truth,
as it is contained in Leonora's eyes, takes on the threatening fathomlessness of
an ocean that will drown any hope of reemerging.
To Leonora's anticlimactic substitute for the horrible truth, "don't you
know th at I'm an Irish Catholic?" Dowell confesses
Those words gave me the greatest relief that I have ever had in my
life. They told me, I think, almost more than I have ever gathered
at any one m om ent-about myself. I d o n 't think that before that
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day I had ever wanted anything very much except Florence. (48)
Oddly, Dowell's admission is true, though he tries to characterize his desire for
Florence as only the satisfied yearning for "at once a wife and unattained
mistress" in whom he found his "occupation. . .career. . .ambition" (50). The
truth of his admission, however, runs deeper than he acknowledges; for
Florence is the consummate actress who defends pretense from truth. If Edward
embodies the code of conduct that gives order to Dowell's world, Florence is the
protector of that code. Thus Florence's deceptions serve Dowell as much as
they serve her. By pretending a heart condition, Florence includes him in the
pretense of the code, providing him with a script to follow, a role to play. Life
w ithout a script, Dowell fears, is life without stability, life without relationships;
in short, life alone.
Lydia Gabbay characterizes Dowell as not just a willingly deceived
husband, but an accomplice to the deception. Proof of Dowell's complicity is
his narration of the Piere Vidal and La Louvre story, "in which a rich husband
pushes his wife into the arms of a troubadour" (Gabbay 444). W hen portraying
Edward, Dowell refers to him as Le Chevalier Bayard, the Cid, and Lohengrinall romantic figures. Gabbay argues that Ford's "adherence to the principle of
le mot juste would preclude the possibility of the use of either this story or the
romantic appellations attached to Edward unless they were meant to illustrate
something" (444). Despite professions of innocence, Dowell makes his
complicity to the deception obvious. The reasons for his collusion in the code
of pretenses th at cast him as a fool are also in evidence as they place him in an
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imprisoning paradox from which he cannot escape.
For Dowell, the absence of an immutable code that "guides. . .personal
contacts, associations, and activities" makes relationships impossible. After the
wreck of his illusions, the bewildered Dowell frequently asks "who in this world
can give anyone a character? Who in this world knows anything of any other
heart—or of his own?" (144). The answer which he formulates in the first pages
of his narrative illustrates the paradoxical position from which he cannot
escape.
I know nothing-nothing in the w orld-of the hearts of men. I
only know that I am alone-horribly alone. No hearthstone will
ever again witness, for me, friendly intercourse. No smoking room
will ever be other than peopled with incalculable simulacra amidst
smoke wreaths. Yet, in the name of God, what should I know if I
d o n 't know the life of the hearth and of the smoking-room, since
my whole life has been passed in those places? (15)
The irony of course is that before the collapse of his coterie, Dowell was
surrounded by inscrutable people hidden behind the veil of polite conduct. He
comes to realize that "the modern English habit of taking every one for
granted-is a good deal to blame" (39) for "the damnable nuisance of. . .never
really get[ting] an inch deeper than" knowing the proper eating, drinking, and
bathing habits of his company (40). But without a code of conduct it is not
possible to know people at all, because "the collection of rules" allows people to
meet and "know at once whether [they] are concerned with good people or with
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those who won’t do” (40); hence, the paradox of Dowell's position is that if he
abandons the code, he’ll never make acquaintances that relieve his isolation.
T he only experience Dowell has outside the pretense of the code leaves him
equally nonplussed. If Dowell did not know the "real" Edward (or Florence, or
Leonora) because the "good" image shrouded him, Dowell knows him even less
after Leonora lifts the veil of that image. Thus, the ocean of truth in Leonora's
eyes does set Dowell afloat, washing him ashore on an island of isolated
confusion and doubt. Having only a deluded sense of truth, however, has an
equally isolating effect.
T he understanding of the coterie th at Dowell seeks through his narrative
eludes him in part because the cast of the coterie is no longer available to him.
Their absence foregrounds a fundamental difference between Dowell's quest
and Strether's quest. Dowell does not have the benefit of dialogue that
Strether does. Ostensibly, this lack results from the constraining past on which
Dowell focuses. Aside from the absence of dialogue in the present, relatively
little dialogue exists in his recollections either. A bout communication with
Florence, Dowell admits that he "had to head conversations, for all those eleven
years, off such topics as love, poverty, crime, and so on" to protect her weak
heart (84). As a foursome the A shburnham s and the Dowells spent
nine years of uninterrupted tranquility. . .characterized by an
extraordinary want of any communicativeness on the part of the
A shburnham s to which [the Dowells] replied by leaving out quite
as extraordinarily, and nearly as completely, the personal note.
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Indeed, you may take it that what characterized [their] relation'
ship was an atmosphere of taking everything for granted. (37)
T he underpinning rule of "good" conduct is "taking everything for granted."
O n the surface the rule guarantees understanding without communication.
Essentially, however, the rule demands silence, so that no one discovers that the
coterie is actually "a prison full of screaming hysterics, tied down so that they
might not outsound the rolling of. . .carriage wheels," or upset the social order
(14). To participate in his society, Dowell must adhere to the vow of silence.
Ironically, what he does to avoid isolation in turn isolates him. In addition it
not only prevents him from knowing his friends, but makes him afraid of either
pursuing or gaining knowledge of them, or himself. The absence of verbal
interaction also allows Dowell to retreat behind his confusion and fear, and
avoid a wider sense of truth. Dowell does not have the advantage of response
that Strether does; Strether's listening characters challenge him to make sense,
to be clear. Dowell has only his "silent reader," and so he does not feel the
pressure to account for his inconsistencies or to overcome incoherence in
relating to others.
To be sure, the dialogue in The Ambassadors isn't always illuminating,
nor does it always forge a bond. Some of Strether's dialogues lead to
misunderstandings. In the world of The Ambassadors people also conceal and
delude themselves. W hen Strether asks Little Bilham of Chad: "Why isn’t he
free if he's good?" (112), Little Bilham responds: "Because it's a virtuous
attachment" (112). This is the answer Strether wants to hear. Little Bilham
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does not lie to Strether per se; his meaning of virtuous is different from
Strether's, but Little Bilham knows th at Strether assumes virtuous to mean
chaste. In exchanges such as these, James illustrates the perils of using language
to gain knowledge. Ironically, the danger is of taking too much for granted-the
same danger that threatens Dowell, albeit in noncommunicativeness. However,
in Jamesian settings, language th at hides or distorts truth does not entirely
negate the efficacy of communication. Despite the misunderstandings that
language can cause, it is ultimately indispensable to Strether's quest for
knowledge. U nderstanding other people demands communication as well as
observation. In the long run, Strether benefits from verbal interaction in his
many conversations with Maria, and in the ethical choice he makes based on
the knowledge he achieves.
James also illustrates that the distortion or concealment of tru th th at can
occur in verbal interaction is sometimes necessary. T hat is to say, James implies
that a certain am ount of deception or protection from the full truth is essential
to the process of expanding knowledge. If discovery of the truth requires some
measure of deception to regulate and insure the process, that deception is a
cooperative interaction between deceiver and deceived. James and Ford
demonstrate th at Strether and Dowell are deceived because they need to be
deceived. Their agreement to accept equivocations and prevarications is
subconscious, but nonetheless the deception requires their participation. In
other words, deception is an implied agreement between the participants to
portion off truth into pieces that are manageable for both the giver and
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receiver. Implicitly this means that "the whole truth and nothing but the
truth" is self-negating, for were the whole truth immediately offered Strether
and Dowell, they would be unable to process and digest any part of its
overwhelming substance and therefore would abandon it entirely.
For both Strether and Dowell, deception is a protective device, much like
a life jacket, but they respond to and use it differently. The deception that
C had and Marie de V ionnet play on Strether is a protective measure necessary
to Strether's quest for truth. They distract Strether from the true nature of
their relationship in order to gain time for themselves and to enable Strether to
see their relationship from their point of view. A nd in the end their deception
aids Strether, for it allows him to resist his "impulse to draw back from the ugly
or disturbing" and "feel morally justified in" participating in their lives (Nettels
49). But Strether reaches a point in the process of knowledge where he does not
need the protection of self-delusion. W hen he discovers that C had and Marie
de V ionnet are lovers he is not devastated by their deception. Indeed, the
discovery strengthens his resolve to double his efforts at promoting Marie de
V ionnet above C had's obligations in Woollett.
Dowell, on the other hand, never overcomes his fear of truth and so he
never removes the buoying self-protection of his illusions. In the end he asserts
that he "loved Edward Ashburnham" because Edward was Dowell himself (227).
All of Dowell's narrative belies this claim, but he clings to it rather than accept
Edward's betrayal of their friendship. Hence, Strether and Dowell wade amid
truth to varying degrees. Strether, in the end, can look more deeply into and
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enjoy more fully the freedom, the confidence, the expanded consciousness that
discovery of the truth brings. Dowell enlarges his sense of truth, but he
continues to panic when its depth becomes unfathomable, clinging to his selfdelusion in order to keep from drowning. Dowell touches the surface of truth,
but always draws back from its depth to gasp for the air of deception that
sustains his shallow self-knowledge and identity.
The extent to which Strether and Dowell realize integrity measures the
success of their quest for truth and self-awareness. In the end they are both
called upon to make ethical choices based on the sense of reality they have
composed. Their choices manifest their ability or inability to be true to
themselves while relating to others in good faith. M aintaining this balance
requires recognizing and accepting reality as a subjective construct that is saved
from total self-absorption by the need to understand other points of view. The
assumption of responsibility is inherent in this achievement.
Strether's final two choices demonstrate his integrity and hence his
success. After learning th at C had and Mme. de V ionnet are lovers, Strether
does not abandon his view of their relationship as beneficial to C had, nor his
view of Mme. de V ionnet as "wonderful." Rather than cutting his losses (i.e. in
order to keep the patronage of Mrs. Newsome), Strether renews his vow to
"save" Mme. de Vionnet. This is not to say that Strether continues under the
spell of Mme. de V ionnet's enigmatic charm; indeed, he sees that her charm is a
heroic effort to conceal, not the immorality of her relationship with Chad, but
the pathos of her situation-her unrequited commitment to C had, a man
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unworthy of her devotion. A nd even though C had's abandonm ent of Mme.
de V ionnet reveals his "carefully controlled callousness and selfishness" (Nettels
48), Strether does not regret his campaign to make Sarah Pocock see the value
of the liaison. Despite betrayal, Strether maintains sympathy for Mme. de
V ionnet's self-defeating love, C had's inability to see that what he is forfeiting
has greater value than his shares in the family business, and Sarah's morally
myopic indignation at Strether's defense of Mme. de Vionnet. By becoming
aware of and expanding beyond the limited world view of the "sacred rage,"
Strether deepens his appreciation of the trials of the hum an heart and mind.
In so doing, he locates the source and validity of multiple perspectives.
A t the same time, Strether gains certainty in his own perspective, his
own sense of ethical conduct. Like C had, he forsakes a "wonderful" woman—
Maria. Unlike C had, however, Strether realizes all that he is forfeiting. But the
ethics of Strether’s choice arise not from forsaking Maria so that "out of the
whole affair" he has not gotten "anything" for himself (344); rather, the ethic
arises from his commitment to learn all th at he could of the truth and make a
judgment based on that knowledge. His success and his ethical integrity spring
from his determination to "make one's account with what one lights on" (306).
Myler Wilkinson explicates the logic of Strether's "ethical moment" (153) as the
acceptance of responsibility to read the "text" or the situation as closely as
possible despite the myriad interpretations that make reality "centerless" or
without an objective, external set of composing laws. If the first obligation of
ethical conduct is to judge all available information, the second is to use that
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knowledge in good faith in relationships. Through his "only logic" (344)
Strether perceives himself as bound to the principle that his services not be self'
serving, thus he is obliged not to gain Maria from Mrs. Newsome’s loss of
himself.
O ne can argue that Strether's expanded knowledge and the ethical
conduct that derives from it leave him more isolated from his fellow beings.
Practically speaking, Strether's journey does result in his aloneness. He forfeits
Mrs. Newsome and Maria. This fact would seem to undercut the contention
that James's vision of the hum an capacity to find meaning and formulate ethics
is optimistic. But if James demonstrates that ethical conduct makes
relationships more difficult, he also implies that it makes them more stable in
the sense that they are founded on deeper understanding.
Dowell's final two choices involve relationships as well. His first
decision, though it concludes the novel, is to allow Edward to commit suicide.
Dowell chooses not to "hinder" Edward because Dowell didn't
think [Edward] was wanted in the world, let his confounded
tenants, his rifle-associations, his drunkards, reclaimed and
unreclaimed, get on as they liked. N ot all the hundreds and
hundreds of them deserved th at that poor devil should go on
suffering for their sakes. (229)
Apropos of Dowell's questions in the first chapter about moral uncertainty, the
final action of the novel resounds with ethical ambiguity. Is Dowell right or
wrong in his decision to allow Edward to kill himself? Dowell justifies his action
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by citing Edward’s misery and his right to choose to die. But in ”trot[ting] off
. . .to Leonora" (229) Dowell seems to abandon Edward callously at a moment
of crisis. O ne might look back to the narrative for guidance. Edward's suicide
actually occurs before Dowell's telling of the story. Nowhere in his narrative
does Dowell show signs of regretting his decision or being disturbed by it.
Indeed, Dowell only reveals on the last page of the novel that he anticipated,
but chose not to "hinder," Edward's suicide. Applying the standards th at make
Strether's final ethical choice correct does not clarify the persistent ambiguity
of Dowell's position. Despite Dowell's intention to read the "text" of his foursquare coterie and judge all available information, in the end Dowell's narrative
is still permeated by inconsistencies th at impede the reader from knowing how
Dowell himself really viewed his conduct. It is arguable th at given his
psychological fragility, Dowell learned as much about Edward as he could and
then acted in good faith by judging the extent of Edward's suffering. A t the
same time one can maintain that Dowell's frustrated self-delusion and
emotional confusion left him with an unresolved anger toward Edward. Thus
compelled by vengeance, Dowell abandons Edward to his "pen-knife" (229).
A nd so the sides of the debate multiply. Ford leaves the reader with the
irresolvable question of Dowell's ethical conduct. But Ford's pessimism resides
not only in the equivocation of Dowell's choice. Ford's bleak vision of the
hum an capacity to formulate ethics based on informed judgment is
demonstrated by the position in which he places the reader. Having gained all
available knowledge of Dowell, the reader faces an impasse of choices that
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frustrates the reader's assumption of responsibility and act of conclusive
interpretation. Finally the reader can only admit what Dowell has
demonstrated throughout his narrative: the hearts and minds of others are
inscrutable.
Ford, of course, foreshadows this conclusion in Dowell's relationship
with Nancy. Dowell chooses to care for her during her madness, hoping for
her recovery. Aside from two repeated utterances, she remains uncommunicative, leaving Dowell essentially isolated, not physically as Strether is by his
ethical choice, but spiritually and emotionally. Again Dowell's position breeds
a multiplicity of argum ents-one being th at Dowell's care of Nancy is his
determination to avoid the disturbing reality of life. It is equally reasonable
that despite his persistent self-delusion, Dowell learns th at the world has no
objective set of rules that compose reality and resigns himself to that one
overwhelming fact. He recognizes the inevitable inscrutability of others that
causes unconquerable isolation and chooses to be with Nancy in her madness,
perhaps the most overt condition of inscrutability. In other words, Ford
demonstrates that the inescapable subjectivity of truth ultimately defeats the
self.
The final positions of Strether and Dowell again raise the issue of
illusion. T he optimism that guides The Ambassadors might be viewed as James's
self-delusory need to find ethical certainty in a world where the absence of
objective moral truths makes such stability an illusion. Indeed the "illusion of
freedom" for which Strether yearns at Gloriani's garden party would seem to be

41
James's admission that free will, i.e. making informed ethical decisions, is
predetermined by limitations of perspective; thus since free will is ever an
illusion, so too must be ethical judgment. But Strether’s discovery that the
"sacred rage," Woollett's prison of moral codes, is relative to those who believe
in it, enables him to adjust his own codes and assumptions thereby exercising,
if not the freedom to formulate his own ethical conduct, then a belief in the
illusion of that freedom that makes it reality. A nd James demonstrates that
ultimately belief creates reality. Thus Strether's belief in his freedom to make
moral judgments constitutes ethical stability.
Ironically, the discovery of subjective reality that frees Strether, imprisons
Dowell. Because he cannot achieve awareness of his complicity in the illusion
of good conduct, Dowell cannot resolve the conflict between illusion and
knowledge. He can never be certain that what he knows is not an illusion
because he cannot know himself. Dowell's discovery that reality has a "myriad
forms" leads him to an awareness of absence th at he cannot see beyond. In
James's world Dowell himself would be behind that absence; he would be the
subject on which reality depends. But in Ford's world, Dowell cannot live, i.e.
exist without an objective code of conduct; thus Dowell cannot see behind the
absence of that code because he himself is made absent by the knowledge that it
is an illusion. In other words, for Dowell knowledge that reality is centered in
the self creates the paradoxical position of negating the subject so that he is
unable to create a stable sense of reality and truth in which he can believe.
In short James's optimism lies in his equation of subjective reality to the
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subject's expanded sense of self. Ford's pessimism lies in his equation of
subjective reality to absence of self.
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